The Why

In Conclusion

       Subsidy policy in the US and the EU align closely with their methods of governance. The EU practices the Precautionary Principle which does not require evidential proof a product is unsafe for human health before government can ban its sale or distribution. The Precautionary Principle explicitly gives government the ultimate power in deciding what is healthy for individual citizens. However, science does not get left behind. The EU heavily subsidizes those crops that are most healthy for their citizens to consume. They also subsidize farmer income directly. The result is not a system of exchange for commodity insurance but tangible support for the farmer from its government. (7, 10)

​

     For the US, policy and law are supported by science and industry experts. (26) Despite the US's policy roots in science, agricultural subsidy policy fails to interact with the food prices that matter the most to the health of the nation's citizens. (13) Agricultural subsidies also easily bend under pressure from interest groups, individual preferences, and political actors. The agribusiness lobby is the largest private interest lobby in the United States. (3) As a result, farmers with more capital have better access to commodity subsidies and crop insurance - both complex systems that demand investment from the farmer. (4, 31)

​

      The US has a more potent breed of capitalism than most of its counterparts in Europe, boasting an economy motivated by individual profit and success. Most of Western Europe has liberal social policy in place (such as government provided health care and larger overall social welfare programs) reflecting a more people-centered method of governance. (7) The precautionary principle displays government dedication to the protection of human health and well-being. This divergent approach to governance is reflected in human health and well-being statistics. (6) Most relevant to the question at hand, food security is directly impacted by government policy.

       In Europe, a diverse range of crops and receive subsidies. Over 70 percent of these subsidies directly support the incomes of the bloc's farmers. The CAP supports sustainable agriculture efforts like organic farming and poly culture while acknowledging future challenges like climate change. (10)

       In the United States, subsidies overwhelming crowd into fields of commodity crops and into the pockets of the nation’s richest farmers that can afford to pay into the commodity programs. The infrastructure of agricultural subsidies guarantees the maintenance of mono culture crop production. (13,14)

       It is difficult to directly connect subsidy policy to food insecurity rates in both areas of the world. However, this site presents some data correlations between the two. For example, EU poverty rates have been higher than US poverty rates for the last two decades. Despite a higher poverty rate, the European Union displays much lower rates of food insecurity. This suggests government policies in the EU make quality foods more affordable for low- and middle-income individuals. Ultimately, the answer to the question, "How do agricultural subsidies impact food security in the EU and the US?" is not black and white. A statistical deep dive into this question revealed a myriad network of correlations between agricultural subsidies and food insecurity in the US and the EU.

      Within the question at hand, the prioritization of what crops receive subsidies is the single most influential factor when it comes to food security rates. Vegetables represent the largest sector of subsidies in the European Union, while the most subsidized sector in the United States is corn (over 95 percent of which is used for ethanol fuel production). Healthy, more quality foods take a backseat to the profits of commodity crops in the United States. Subsequently, this impacts food prices, food quality, and food security ensuring citizens of the European Union have greater access to healthy, affordable foods than citizens of the United States.  (3, 10, 17)